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Summary
The political constitution of markets is promoted by Montchrestien whereas, on the contrary,
the absolute autonomy of the sphere of exchange is favoured by Cantillon. Yet, this article
seeks to demonstrate that both authors participate in the emergence of a modern way of
thinking about the economy. In both cases, we find the idea that the sphere of exchange
acquires an autonomy which requires the application of a specific science. In the case of
Cantillon, this autonomy is absolute and anticipates the foundations of contemporary
economics. On the other hand, Montchrestien’s work forms part of a “political economy”.
This article also aims to show that the mercantilism attributed to Montchrestien in no way
implies that, in principle, the economy is a simple transposition of a war-like model.
Similarly, it will seek to show that Cantillon, a supposed mercantilist, does not suggest that
state intervention is futile, even if he adheres to the fundamental principles of economic
liberalism. This modernity has two sides, represented by these texts which present economics
as a science since its very beginnings.
Key words
sovereignty, political economy, money, Montchrestien, Cantillon, modernity, liberalism,
trade, exchange, markets, self-regulation, auto-constitution of society
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 The translation of French texts into English is either our own or has been reviewed by ourselves. We have
chosen to translate Montchrestien’s and Cantillon’s work using contemporary English syntax and orthography.
2Introduction The different modernities of Montchrestien and Cantillon
Given that modernity is such a polysemous word, we would like to make it clear that, for us,
the term refers to the point in Western civilisation when, from the 16
th
 Century onwards,
politics, religion and economics progressively came to be regarded as separate categories.
Modernity was formed at the end of the 18
th
 Century, following both the French political
revolution and the British Industrial Revolution. This process has taken a number of different
directions: whereas Cantillon’s Essai
2
 forms part of the prolegomena of liberal thought in
economics almost a century before, Montchrestien’s Traicté
3
 heralds a conception of
economics which reveals another facet of modernity. For Montchrestien, modernity holds that
religion, as a stimulus for moral standards, finds itself assigned to a subordinate role in social
life. In order to avoid the disintegration of the social body, politics must embed economic
activity, the autonomy of which is fundamentally relative. Such a line of thinking presupposes
a hint of autonomy between what now appear to be obviously separate dimensions of social
life – religion, economics and politics – without implying that society develops by itself
4
 or
that the economy functions autonomously. We are indeed led to speak of the ‘economy’ and
of ‘politics’ separately where Montchrestien is concerned in order to elucidate the concepts
which make sense for the contemporary reader
5
. Without doubt, this exercise in conceptual
distinction between economics and politics is less daring with regard to Cantillon’s work.
Our hypothesis is that the 17th Century marks a rupture in the development of
modernity. It is even possible to argue that these two works reflect the changing situation in
Western economies, characterised by the growth of market regulations. Actually, the
development of the beginning of a system of markets is the unexpected result of more modest
policies promoted by authors such as Montchrestien. Indeed, promoting commercial links was
by no means the equivalent of having self-regulating markets. Similarly, the theoretical work
of Cantillon, in the image of those who one began to call “economists” at the end of the 18
th
Century, aims to isolate a particular kind of exchange, the economic exchange, as the
foundation of a new social order. It is in the context of these hypotheses that we will show
that Montchrestien elaborates a deeply political way of thinking about the economy as an
emerging facet of social life. He marks a rupture with ancient and medieval thought according
to which the economy was deeply anchored in other ideological elements and social relations.
We will nevertheless show how the modernity of Montchrestien’s comments contrasts with
the beginning of the liberal modernity which is embodied by Cantillon. In this way, we hope
to show that even if the progressive distinction between what we today call economics,
politics and religion is a necessary condition of all modern thought, there is absolutely no
reason why the movement of aspects of social life towards absolute autonomy should
constitute the key to modernity. The moment of Western intellectual life inaugurated by
Montchrestien is still relevant because the question of the emancipation of the economy from
society will always be posed, rightly or wrongly.
                                                 
2
 Essay on the Nature of Trade in General, c. 1730. Concerning the importance of Cantillon’s work to the birth
of economics as a science, see the article by A. Murphy [1997, p. xxvii].
3
 Treatise of Political Economy, c. 1615.
4
 But, the idea that society develops autonomously should not be interpreted as economic determinism.
5
 The apparent arbitrariness of these distinctions is tempered by the fact that these concepts are the fruit of the
period in which modernity developed. It goes without saying that Montchrestien never used these terms, given
that they were only invented in the 19
th
 Century. Nonetheless, in order to understand the meaning of historical
texts, one cannot avoid using words and descriptions that are not those of the 17
th
 Century: a totally contextual
reading is impossible.
3In the first part (General Anthropology or Economic Anthropology), we will outline the
hypothesis according to which the keystone of Montchrestien’s work is non-contractualist
anthropology which places the monarch, this distinctive imago dei, at the centre of the social
sphere. Good government can only be exercised by the monarch who is necessary to the
social order because he understands the foundations of human nature and knows how to lead
the people. On the contrary, Cantillon’s portrayal of human nature belongs to an anthropology
which is no longer ‘general’ but ‘economic’, typical of liberal modernity. The second part
(The Economy: Instituted Process or Self-Regulating Market?) explains Montchrestien’s
conception of the economy according to which there are three kinds of exchange which
structure the sphere of commerce. Pure economic exchange does not appear as such in the
sense that the social nature of exchange is still apparent. In the third part (Political Economy
or Commerce in General), we will show how Montchrestien demonstrates that this knowledge
of human nature can be used to promote the wealth of the people and the power of the
monarch: thus is explained the necessary return of the monarch to the economic sphere
which, without him, is dysfunctional. In this discourse, there is no principle of the self-
regulating market as a mechanism for the allocation of resources. Instead, there is a set of
principles which are meant to regulate the volume of exchange, to protect the production of
the Kingdom and to educate men. This does not mean that Montchrestien had no notion of the
benefits that could be made from exchange. On the contrary, Cantillon’s model rests on a
purely economic conception of exchange. In the fourth part (‘Mercantilism’, Commerce and
Money), we will show that, for Montchrestien, the monetary question is subordinate to other
questions. This is something which may surprise us, coming from the pen of a ‘mercantilist’,
and forces us to reexamine somewhat this concept which is also developed by many readers
of Cantillon. The conclusion (Modernities in the Traicté and the Essai) returns to a theme
which has structured our argument: to what extent can it be said that Montchrestien’s political
economy
6
 is in any sense modern? Indeed, for the most part, political economy does not herald
contemporary economics, as is shown by the comparison made with the work of Cantillon
who, on the contrary, proposes a pure economic paradigm. The arguments of this author are
mixed with more traditional elements that the concept of ‘mercantilism’ partly incorporates. It
is nonetheless possible, via a comparative approach to these two authors, to make a contrast
which highlights the changes that the 17
th
 Century involved in Europe and the contradictory
aspects of modernity in economics.
General Anthropology or Economic Anthropology?
The Traicté can be disconcerting for a contemporary reader because it takes the form of
written advice given to the King of France in order to enable him to elaborate the procedures
of ‘good government’. This kind of essay is a classic topos, common to societies of the
Ancien Régime. Thus, without doubt, Montchrestien’s book does not contain an economic
theory in the contemporary sense of the word. It constitutes more of a doctrine which outlines
a set of principles. It does not make the distinction between normative and positive registers
which is familiar to contemporary theoretical systems. Yet, this does not prevent the author
from developing a coherent conception of politics as an art supported by an anthropology
which is understood as a commentary on human nature. According to Montchrestien [1615],
                                                 
6
 According to the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online, the term ‘political economy’ or ‘œconomie
politique’, as used by Montchrestien, “signified an attempt to extend the art of estate management to the entire
kingdom of Louis XIII and his successors. This usage, generalised to mean a ‘system’ of policy designed to
‘increase the riches and power’ of a country, remained current until the end of the 18th Century”.
4politics is the government of the Common Weal. He supports the idea of natural sociability
because his portrayal of man as a ‘social animal’ comes to him from Aristotle [p. 57]. This
point is important because it implies that the science of ‘public householding’ or even of
‘political economy’ is the product of a general anthropology. The Aristotelian thesis taken up
by the author should not surprise us: it was only in the middle of the 17
th
 Century that theories
of the social contract were really developed
7
. Far from taking a contractualist view of the
political foundation of society, Montchrestien considered that man was reasonable to the
extent that “he sometimes embraces public service with a passionate desire […] In this way,
often reserving the smallest part of his life for himself, he voluntarily dedicates the greatest
and best part of his life to the service of others”. In other words, it is by the very exercise of
his reason that man manages to reconcile his private and collective interests.
 What we will from now on call the ‘social division of labour’ is considered as another
important form of social ‘cement’ by Montchrestien. This is why, despite how his work may
appear on the surface, Montchrestien cannot be considered to follow Aristotle. He disagrees
with the vita activa of the Ancients as well as the vita contemplative of the Middle-Ages,
favouring a healthy vita activa of a new and particular kind, characterised by the importance
given to industry over political action
8
. For Montchrestien, a vita activa is a wholly economic
way of life, politics being the privilege of the monarch and not of his subjects.  Here we are
far from the ancient model in which the precondition of freedom is being able to live off the
work of others thanks to one’s membership of the political community. This is why it is
necessary to analyse the criticism that the author makes of “contemplative life” [p. 56] which
being “the closest to God” is pointless without action.
It would certainly be difficult to justify ‘occupation’ or ‘action’ in pre-Weberian terms,
as François Billacois would have us believe in the introduction to his edition of the Traicté:
the fact that Montchrestien [p. 57] claims that it is sufficient to contemplate “the works of
God” on the Seventh Day is not proof of Protestantism but a simple sign that divine
commandment is the condition of the wealth of the people and, consequently, of kings. In
other words, there is nothing in that which could be considered to be proof of heresy by
Catholics of his time
9
. On the contrary, Cantillon [p. 53], after having lambasted the
unproductive role of the monks, enquires into the economic consequences of the Reformation,
explaining that “States which have embraced [Protestantism] have become visibly more
powerful” because Catholics have numerous religious holidays. Nonetheless, both authors
reject the primacy of contemplative life over other ways of life. In this sense, Cantillon and
Montchrestien say the same thing with regard to the relationship which should be established
between economy and religion, from the viewpoint of the quest for wealth and the power of
the State.
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 These social contract theories where only really seriously questioned by Hume in the 18th Century.
8
 We are here using Arendt’s terminology [1958].
9
 Perrot [1992, p. 64], who takes Montchrestien’s thought seriously, places it in the context of a civilising
process in which the emphasis is placed on “the refusal of Christian economy according to moral theology, work
as punishment, just price and idleness of capital”. The origin of such a refusal seems to result from the
dislocations caused by “the progress of Nation-States since the 15
th
 Century, the Renaissance and the Protestant
Reformation”. Perrot’s proposition has the advantage of highlighting the numerous factors contributing to the
creation of a new way of presenting the economy (even if the Reformation may be seen rather as a consequence
of this civilising process than as the cause of economic transformation). Nonetheless, it does not seem that
Montchrestien buries the question of just price in favour of an implicit thesis of the auto-constitution of the
economy. On the contrary, the monarch, as the wise architect of the social sphere, is the one who regulates the
economic process in terms of quantities and prices thanks to his good administration.
5Unlike Cantillon, Montchrestien’s general depiction of society is strongly
characterised by a priori which reveal religious transcendence. He points out that royal
authority derives from the “supreme power of God” [p. 43]. Yet he also claims that this power
should only be exercised in the interest of the “Common Weal” and that the power of religion
must be subordinated to that of the sovereign: “It is a great tool in the hands of he who knows
how to use it correctly” [p. 224]. Natural sociability must not be corrupted by a false
interpretation of religious texts. Consequently, one part of his programme of political
economy states, “From there, it follows that the most important role of the State is to prevent
any part of it from becoming useless” [p. 58]. Montchrestien goes as far as to suggest that
economic sanctions should be used to control the activities of the clerics. He explains that
since ecclesiastical privileges are granted by the monarch, it is his responsibility to ensure that
they are not abused [p. 227]. As a good Gallican, he reminds us, “Always remember that the
Church is in the State, not the State in the Church” [p. 228].
If the clerics must then be the instruments of the monarch, the people, and particularly
those who make up the “Labourers”, must be the focus of the practice of good government.
The kingdom is composed of “three principal orders: clerics, nobles and commoners” [p. 46].
Justice is a kind of “cement” which “sticks” these three orders together. Montchrestien
divides the “order of commoners” into Labourers, Craftsmen and Merchants [p. 46-7]. The
King, allowing laws to be properly applied, thus transforms the “multitude” [p. 267] into a
social body. This in no way means that the powers of the police or the administration of
justice result from the arbitrary power of the King. On the contrary, Montchrestien deplores
the existence of too many laws, citing the example of Julius Cesar who “intended to limit the
civil law to a few principles” [p. 277]. He is also concerned about the poor quality of the
judges, which undermines royal authority. In addition, he nonetheless reminds the King that,
even if God elected him as his “Lieutenant on Earth”
10
, “you must ensure that his will is
done” [p. 272].
Yet, the venality of office goes against the very will of God who wishes “justice to be
properly delivered to your People by each Magistrate” [idem]. Indeed, he writes, “You must
therefore look for and invent all legitimate means in order to wipe out the venality of public
office […] The ambition of honours means that those which are put up for sale find many
buyers unworthy of owning that which they purchase” [p. 274]. This is why he cites Henry
VIII as an example. He reportedly only granted public office to those who did not ask for such
honours and who were highly knowledgeable in “Theology” and “Jurisprudence” [p. 266].
The venality of office is a source of injustice which is a danger to the social order. Worse,
when justice, an important branch of “public affairs”, becomes the object of “avarice”, it must
rightly be suspected of “lengthening trials” [p. 278]; some “instruct”, others “summon”, and
others finally “adjudicate on the case”. Nonetheless, venality alone is not responsible for the
creation of this gold digging process that the exercise of justice is becoming. Montchrestien
also denounces the rise of judge-made law whilst magistrates ought to be bound to be made to
“judge according to laws and ordinances without in any way being able to stray from them
under whatever pretext. Laws must control magistrates, not the other way around” [p. 277].
Against this confusion of public and private interest, Montchrestien asserts, “there is no vice
more dangerous than greed amongst those who handle public affairs” [p. 278]. This proves
the extent to which public action differs in nature from private conduct.
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 This means that the King takes the place of God on Earth.
6The image of the monarch, concerned for the well-being of his people, limiting the
abuse of judicial power and controlling the clerics, finds its greatest expression in the
reciprocity which must be forged between the people and the monarch: “Whosoever is called
to govern the people must love them in order to be loved himself because their love is his
strongest defence, his unassailable fortress” [p. 80-1]. As the strength of royal power resides
in the very love the sovereign has for his subjects, we have gone beyond the necessary royal
benevolence that Montchrestien evokes elsewhere [p. 80]. This entails a classical
anthropological model which may be refined by studying more closely the role of God who,
looking over us, is the vigilant master of this reciprocity. But, if proof of the benefaction of
the monarch is his munificence, the good King being he who knows how to give,
Montchrestien takes care, as the master of public householding, to remind the King of the
need to exercise distributive justice, notably with regard to the attribution of such costly
honours. He explains that the monarch must remember that it is “the pure blood of your
people which deserves to be used for good, useful and honest ends” [p. 259]. Indeed, the
author fears that the munificence of the monarch conflicts with the good practice of
governance when royal generosity is monopolised by the nobility [p. 260].
According to Montchrestien, the final important characteristic of good government is
“Censure”. This term covers two ideas which are strongly linked, as was already the case for
the Roman census which combined an evaluation of one’s wealth and of one’s moral
qualities. Montchrestien favours a return to the past in this respect and even asserts, “From the
moment the Roman Empire stopped using the census, it headed straight for decline” [p. 233].
Montchrestien suggests going even further in this return to Antiquity, suggesting not only a
return to the original “liturgies” [p. 237]
11
 but also to another old Athenian legal practice
which allowed trials to be brought in order to prove that other citizens could better afford to
fulfill their liturgical duties
12
. Montchrestien is convinced that knowledge of the true wealth
of some citizens or, on the contrary, of the genuine poverty of others, is an effective guarantee
of political stability.
Nonetheless, the use of Roman, or sometimes even Hellenist rhetoric, common under
the Ancien Régime, can mask the fundamental modernity of Montchrestien’s writing. The
Roman model of public virtue is magnified by the example of Tribune Drusus “who wanted to
make holes in his house so that everyone could see inside” [p. 236]. This would at first appear
to be an example of freedom in the ancient sense of the term, far removed from the “freedom
of the Moderns”. Yet, this powerful image, when placed in the general logic of the Traicté,
aims to show that those who have nothing to hide concerning the real source of their wealth
have nothing to worry about. For Montchrestien, good merchants have nothing to fear from
public judgment. In other words, his treatise is not a real exaltation of the “Freedom of the
Ancients” in the sense that these words would have had for Constant: it rather involves the
development of a social and political model which legitimates itself by a very selective
reading of ancient Greco-Roman or biblical texts.
There is consequently a huge gulf between Montchrestien and the other unmistakably
modern authors of the following century, such as Hume, who were the true architects of a
genuine economic anthropology. Our hypothesis is that Cantillon is one of these architects,
explaining the unexpected and sometimes harmful consequences for society of the conflict of
interests motivated by economic considerations. From this point of view, numerous
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 In classical Athens, the institution of liturgies obliged wealthy citizens to fulfill a number of civic duties, such
as arming a warship etc.
12
 However, this practice led to the growth of the legal procedures that Montchrestien deplores elsewhere.
7contemporary economists are not any more modern, when studying the wanderings of the
invisible hand. Indeed, placing homo economicus at the heart of this discourse does not mean
systematically rejecting the benefits of certain political actions. In this respect, the
mercantilist dimension of Cantillon’s work expresses an aspect of the classical liberal
problem of justifying selective forms of state intervention.
Consequently, instead of ordering society around this sovereign figure of a privileged
imago dei, Cantillon removes all traces of religious transcendence in the formation of social
relations. Politics becomes an economic technique of governing men. What remains of
sovereignty can be glimpsed at in a passage in which Cantillon, assuming that “land belongs
to no one in particular”, and then showing all the difficulties that this engenders, claims, “it
would always be necessary to fall back upon a law to settle ownership in order to establish a
society, whether the law rested upon force or upon policy” [p. 4]. Is there here the slightest
link with sovereignty as “the absolute and eternal power of a Common Weal”, as defined by
Bodin who had considerable influence over Montchrestien? Does the idea of sovereignty not
dissolve into a simple demand for government which a society of propertied people accepts to
freely delegate according to their interests?
The contrast between Cantillon and Montchrestien is striking. For the former, social life
frees itself radically from all religious transcendence. The social division of labour regulates
itself according to the procedures of a society conditioned by the profits of merchants. There
consequently emerges an equilibrium
13
 resulting from equalization of return on investment
[p. 29 sq.]. But, it may be possible, despite the “considerable” place given to the market in
Cantillon’s work, to show that the market “can never create efficient mechanisms of price
gravitation or stable equilibrium”, as Grenier has written [1996, p. 34], explaining that
“market ‘imperfection’ is considerable in Cantillon’s work”. If what we mean by ‘efficiency’
is what the general equilibrium theory has taught us, this claim is undoubtedly correct.
Nevertheless, from the Austrian point of view of the “tendency towards equilibrium”
14
, it is
possible to assert with certitude that the efficiency of the market is a process for Cantillon, the
role of entrepreneurs being crucial for the proper application of a trend which never reaches
its aim. Most importantly, Cantillon makes no mention of the possible benevolence of social
actors who are basically regarded as economic actors. Thus, there is no basic need for a king
beyond the necessity to have the rules of society respected: “It is need and necessity which
enable farmers, craftsmen of every kind, merchants, officers, soldiers, sailors, domestic
servants and all the other classes who work or are employed in the country, to exist. All these
working people serve not only the King and the landowners but each other”.
On the contrary, for Montchrestien, the charity of the monarch is necessary in order to govern
the social community, because the “ecclesiastical state” is not the principal component of the social
order. Actually, religion is only a “tool” to be used by the King of France. Montchrestien emphasises
rather the role of Censure in the moral strengthening of sociability. It is the role of the monarch to
remind men of their innate kindness. The monarch should show them the example which should serve
as social glue for the political order. The chapter entitled, Of Exemplarity and the King’s Main
Concerns [p. 213], is particularly illustrative of this concern. The author even claims that the monarch
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 It would be an exaggeration to make Cantillon the precursor of this issue. It should not be forgotten that our
task only aims to highlight several aspects of modernity in economics which emerged between the beginning of
the 17
th
 Century and the beginning of the 18
th
 Century. The work of Montchrestien and Cantillon necessarily has
the rather arbitrary purpose of marking out the key issues. For instance, see Mac Donald [1966, p. 109].
14
 See Kirzner [1973], a great supporter of the entrepreneur as the keystone to the tendency towards equilibrium.
He seeks to show the path which could eventually lead to equilibrium, thanks to the entrepreneur who is “alert”
to the opportunities for profit that are “waiting to be noticed” [p. 74].
8“exists for his people” [p. 221], who “represents and moderates the body politic” (our italics) and
should make use of the desire for imitation that resides within each one of us for the good of the social
order as a whole [p. 217-8]. In keeping with the intellectual trends of his day, Montchrestien also
invokes the figure of the monarch as image of God or image of Christ
15
, thus reinforcing the
importance given to the function of representation unique to the King: “Though all men are divine
creatures […] kings are separate from the rank of commoners. As the true children of God, they have
more divine characteristics and lineaments. Thus they are to this Eternal Divinity what shadow is to
the body, the image to the thing” (our italics, [p. 215])
16
. For Montchrestien, society is thus formed by
moral ties, reinforced by good government which knows how to use man’s inclination to imitate or
emulate. Society is not born of the conflict between hedonistic individuals when faced with scarcity,
as Cantillon would argue. For Montchrestien, there can be no concept of Market: markets only exist
where merchants are subjected to government regulation. Montchrestien, reader of Aristotle, even if he
does not mention his name here, considers that genuine scarcity is indeed that of honours, not of
goods. The developments concerning the regeneration of Royal Orders [p. 230] are the consequence of
this curious portrayal of the world because these orders, supported by proper censure, are the
conditions of this exemplarity which is so essential to social stability. Contrary to Cantillon, the
economic system according to Montchrestien is not the result of market mechanisms which are
supposed to be capable of producing the basis of economic order. It is this hypothesis that we shall
explore further below.
The Economy: Instituted Process or Self-Regulating Market?
Contrary to Cantillon whose work is more analytical and reveals a world which seems closer
to our own, Montchrestien proposes a rather unique economy. The world he describes is not
condemned to generally restrictive scarcity because men are numerous and their aptitude for
work is excellent: only poor government can spoil this plenty which is the gift of God
17
. But
beyond this singularity that liberal modernity might compare to archaism, the Traicté
nevertheless plays a role in the creation of a modernity: “The plan to link domestic affairs (the
economy) to the affairs of the State (politics) is new”
18
. The Traicté is not a relic which, if we
are to follow some textbooks on the history of economic thought, is more suitable for citation
than for study. Montchrestien is all too often known only for his invention of the commonly-
used syntagm, political economy
19
. Today, it would be generally incongruous to combine
reflection on the scarcity of honours, competition between merchants and the nature of
sovereignty. Contemporary ways of thinking do not immediately allow us to make sense of
this treatise in which political, social and economic dimensions are so interlinked. Yet, are
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 See Kantorowicz [1957]. This body of the king, the corpus mysticum, is immortal, in contrast to the other body
of the king which is material and perishable
16
 Moreover, this passage may, strictly speaking, pose a theological problem, given that Christianity states that
every man is imago dei. In addition, the King should, following the same theological-political line of
interpretation, only incarnate immortal judicial power. Yet, in emphasising the fact that the King is “separate
from the commoners”, being the only perfect image of God, Montchrestien upsets the theologico-political
treatise of the “king’s two bodies” which, for the Christian, remains a way of reconciling faith in Christ and the
acceptance of political power. If Montchrestien affirms with such conviction that kings are the “true children of
God”, it is without doubt in order to justify a monarchial absolutism considered necessary to avoid ever returning
to what the kingdom was like during the wars of religion.
17
 We are conscious that this feature of Montchrestien’s thought, i. e. the place of gift in political economy, could
be developed further in so far as the Treatise partly reflects sixteenth-century France in which the gift has a very
special place [Zemon Davis, 2000].
18
 Perrot [1992, p. 63].
19
 To the best of our knowledge, the Traicté is the first text in which the expression political economy is used in
the way it is commonly understood today.
9common definitions of economics, which rely on the concepts of scarcity and utility, not the
reason why the Traicté is often misunderstood and ill-appreciated? Moreover, the triumph of
liberal modernity the following century eclipsed authors such as Montchrestien, leading one
to forget that liberalism is only one facet of modernity.
In order to better understand this world which is painted by Montchrestien, let us
cautiously employ some of the contemporary categories that the Traicté helped to inspire. The
sphere of the economy, which constitutes the investigative field of this work, refers to all the
means and institutions essential to the very livelihood of man. Markets and money only have
subordinate roles. In so far as politics is the art of linking the natural sociability of man to the
principle of sovereignty, it ensures that political economy is the science of the governance of
man, allowing the monarch to adopt the best means possible to increase the wealth of his
people and, thus, of himself. Consequently, Montchrestien can be better understood thanks to
the “substantive” conception
20
 according to which the economy is an “instituted process”
21
.
This conception includes the question of social values, essential to ancient writers. Therefore,
political economy does not equate with rational knowledge of the allocation of scarce
resources through the price system
22
.
Cantillon presents the link between the economy and politics in a different way. He no
longer accords the monarch an essential role in the process of the constitution of society,
which is a partial result of a century of upheavals affecting the economic structure of society.
The idea that the economy can be political vanished in favour of a reflection on “commerce in
general”. Following the explicit cost-benefit model, Cantillon [1755, p. 33] attempts to show
that the monarch, “owner of a large estate as if there were no other in the world”, has every
interest to off-load the cost of administering his estate, establishing market procedures which
thus transform his “overseers” into “entrepreneurs” [p. 34]. He thus shows that the structure
of production adjusts itself to the variations of consumption via the price system and the
action of entrepreneurs [p. 35-36]. The economy regulates itself and in this system the
monarch becomes nothing more than a landowner who owns a larger estate than the others
and who enforces the law. How different to Montchrestien’s world in which the monarch has
an eminent role to play in the proper administration of markets! According to Cantillon, the
economy can function very well without any intervention in its internal mechanisms no
matter what principle of sovereignty is applied. It is the entrepreneurs’ desire for profit which
is at once the motor and the guarantee of economic stability which is hardly distinguishable
from the social order.
 The science of commerce in general is thus essentially different from political economy
which aims to be a source of inspiration for “good government”. Contrary to Cantillon,
Montchrestien does not pretend to discover anything that has not already been discovered, the
truth of the present finding its origins in a past which can forever serve as an example.
Political economy often presents itself as an interpretation of texts even if it clearly does not
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 Nobel Prize-winner Douglass North [1977] wrote that it was necessary to meet the polanyian challenge in the
field of the history of facts. But, we think that there is also a substantive or polanyian challenge in the field of the
history of ideas.
21
 This is Polanyi’s [1977, p. 25] idea according to which the “scarcity situation” is not universal because society
can determine the means and ends of economic activity. The “substantive economy” relates to “interactions
between man and his surroundings” [p. 31] and to the “institutionalisation of that process”. In order for man’s
livelihood to be exposed to the fewest possible hazards [p. 34], it is necessary for collective behavioural rigidities
to develop. In this way, the market is an “instituted process”.
22
 Indeed, E. Khalil [1996] is right in arguing that Robbin’s conception of economics has won out over that
presented by Alfred Marshall or Karl Polanyi, yet the issue has not yet been entirely settled.
10
limit itself to that. Starting from a criticism of the Ancients, Montchrestien affirms that the
Greeks and the Romans had not grasped the importance of the “regulatory function” of
political economy: “All boils down to the fact that in the State (just as in the family), it is in
the interests of all to govern men according to their own and particular inclinations  […]
Contrary to the opinion of Aristotle and Xenephon, it can be asserted that the economy cannot
be separated from government without destroying the Whole […] They ignored the principle
of public householding with which the responsibility of the State should be mainly
concerned.” [p. 67]. It is this very idea of “public householding” which characterises the
invention of political economy: those in power are responsible for the welfare of men because
they have a science the Ancients did not yet have. It is the reason why Montchrestien rebukes
Antiquity for its lack of reflection on the social division of labour
23
 as it exists in the towns:
“Coming back to the Ancients […], in their books we cannot even find any ordinances or
guidelines on how to adapt men to states and train them for the liberal arts and trade,
according to the capacity, temperament, utility and needs of each country” [p. 49].
Montchrestien wants to be the conscious witness of new times; he distances himself from a
number of his own previous claims according to which the Greco-Romans or the Hebrews are
the source of truth.
We noted above the contrast between Cantillon’s belief that the economy has the
capacity to regulate itself and Montchrestien’s discourse which suggests this is impossible. It
would be incorrect to assert that a single pure economy exists in the Essai to the extent that
the author himself provides a genuinely sociological dimension which is essential to his
analysis. For instance, it is sufficient to recall his conjectural model of history which details
the steps from a planned economy to a more efficient market economy which tends to balance
itself. As an example of economic dynamics, the author invokes the fact that “entrepreneurs
[…] always take as their model the lords and owners of the land. They imitate them in their
clothing, meals and mode of life”. Before such an idea had even developed, imitation as a key
element of the sociology of the economy is present in his analysis. There is no fusion between
social thought in general and that of the economy in particular but there is the idea that social
constraints determine the ultimate economic point of equilibrium. This makes Cantillon a
clear figure of modernity since socio-economics does not, in principle, seek to deny the
existence of pure economics, but rather to complement them.
“Political Economy” or “Commerce in General”
Montchrestien’s mercantilism is not a theory which considers the wealth of the State as the
main consequence of monetary abundance. What is decisive for him is agriculture [p. 78-9]
which is just as much a moral as an economic factor: “From the time of our fathers […] our
very Nobility lived in the countryside. Since people have migrated to the towns, evil has
increased … idleness has developed”. This is why the riches of France, “her wheat and her
wines make her richer than all Perus” [p. 60]. It is, in the final analysis, the “abundance of
men” which is the real reason for this wealth [idem]. Montchrestien thus underlines the
quality of the workforce in this extremely rich kingdom, which would be a “world” capable of
surviving without other worlds. If the source of wealth of the people of the kingdom comes
from its size and the number of its subjects, it is natural to question the proper organisation of
the division of labour in this World-Economy that is France. Certainly, Montchrestien never
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 The term “division of labour” is never used in the text.
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uses the term, division of labour, as was underlined above. He evokes “this public work,
divided between the liberal arts and trade” [p. 73] which ought to be the object of “political
foresight”. Nothing is said about the commercial origins of this division; it is above all
claimed that it cannot spontaneously regulate itself for the common good. This description of
the economy is coherent with the idea that labour must be instituted by the monarch. It is
recommended that he use all the regulations possible to allow the liberal arts and trade to
flourish: the “emulation” [p. 72] praised by Montchrestien should be used for the good of
society. But if this emulation is left to its own devices, the author fears that it is entirely
possible, given the sad state of industry in France, that the forces of competition could be
more favourable to foreigners than to the subjects of the King. Thus, Montchrestien, fully
aware of the importance of the division of labour and of emulation, asserts that these two
things cannot spontaneously contribute to the social good.
 Indeed, the private economy is the model for the national economy and only a good
government can make a good economy. Firstly, Montchrestien underlines that “private
occupation makes public occupation” to assert that “good private government […] is an
example for public government” [p. 52]. From this, we cannot simply deduct that political
economy is nothing more than the art of the good management of the oikos which may be
considered as the Kingdom of France, because Montchrestien is a Modern who does not
present the Kingdom as such. For him, it is about defending conscious state interventionism in
what were starting to be perceived as economic mechanisms
24
. This is assuredly novel. It
should be possible to distinguish Montchrestien’s mechanistic view of society, which
supposes the existence of a kind of a social architect, from a spontaneous view of society,
characterised by the primacy given to emergent phenomena. Therefore, custom, which from
this angle appears to be the very prototype of spontaneous phenomenon, is neglected by
Montchrestien.
The proper administration of markets and the correct management of the flow of money
are a considerable part of Montchrestien’s system, even if it cannot be forgotten that, for him,
the wealth of the people is founded upon agriculture and, above all, men, meaning labour.
Political economy is thus not a science of the market system: it simply represents the
emergence of the notion of political economy as we understand it today. The economy as
commerce is marked by a separation which keeps reappearing in an obsessive way. Indeed,
there are two worlds of exchange for Montchrestien: the world of foreign trade places itself in
opposition to the world of domestic trade
25
. In this respect, we could not possibly qualify the
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 It is necessary to distinguish between two different ways in which society is represented by many political
thinkers from the end of the 17th Century and the 18th Century. For some, society is conceived of as a machine,
organised by a social architect or a deus ex machina: Smith himself uses the watch analogy. For others, society is
considered as an organism which develops independently of any human or divine intervention. In this
framework, which can be qualified as a “spontaneous view of society” as opposed to a mechanistic view, society
is no longer subjected to a teleological principle. Two models thus clash with each other: the machine
mechanism on one side and the vitality of the organism on the other. It goes without saying that the role of
politics and the economy is different in the two models – see Deleule’s [1979] commentary on Hume. We can
understand why Hayek [1988] cites Ferguson as one of his inspirations.
25
 Larrère [1992, p. 111-113] developed a thesis on the “Aristotelian structure of mercantilism” that we in part
support. Indeed, below we highlight a specific mode of foreign trade which could benefit everyone. Certainly,
Spector [2003, p. 305] rightly points out a passage in Montchrestien’s work in which liquid metaphors seem to
be the key to his system: “It is as if one is holding a vase of water in each hand, pouring liquid from one to the
other.  The matter is different for  merchants and agents of foreign merchants. They both serve as pumps,
sucking the blood from our people and selling it abroad” [p. 303].  Montchrestien clearly regrets this loss of
money for the State. But a strict Aristotelian structure of exchange should rest on the idea of the exchange of
equivalents as if there was no possible profit to be made from it. Yet, as we see it, this idea that commerce is not
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author’s reflections as economic nationalism, unless we wanted to hide what we consider to
be decisive in his work. Admittedly, as the money supply is considered to be a constant,
Montchrestien often claims that foreign or external trade is a zero-sum game. Yet his thoughts
on the subject are more nuanced: he also notes that the different social relationships which
characterise domestic and foreign trade
26
 are fundamentally different from the social
relationships which characterise foreign trade. This latter is effectively understood as arbitrary
rule, inequality of trading relations and totally unjust laws, which cannot generate the gain
from trade that is the main feature of domestic exchanges. The King’s subjects are then, for
the most part, all obliged to follow the same law where the feeling of reciprocal goodwill is
highly effective
27
. The economic nationalism that we sometimes think we detect in this text is
the necessary result of the fact that competition between states is ferocious.
“The commerce of inside” [p. 291] is considered to be “safer” and more widespread
than “the commerce of outside”, considered as “bigger, more renowned, riskier and
susceptible to profits and losses”. It is as if these two models of exchange structure the work
of the author. We find a model of markets in which exchange is subordinate to the social
sphere and embodies forms of social relationships corresponding to cultural values.
Montchrestien writes a sentence which echoes an ancient commercial mentality: “It is said
that one can never lose what the other cannot win. That is correct, especially with regard to
trade. However, I would say that in trade that is carried out between citizens, there is no loss
for the public” [p. 303]. Moreover, he invokes another side of the market in which “negative
reciprocity”
28
 dominates because the commercial partner does not belong to any pre-existing
social community. The parties to the exchange are in a state of radical otherness, the relations
between groups or individuals are not sufficiently durable to be instituted. In this respect, it is
worth noting that it is still a challenge to economics as a science to create a profitable system
through a priori selfish exchanges. The very existence of the transaction cost theory shows
this to be true.
In addition, he foresees that asymmetrical positions in the process of exchange are
harmful from the collective point of view – another contemporary and topical problem. For
him, the laws of foreign states create the imbalance of trade which harms the subjects of the
King of France. He observes that trade between France and Spain, on the other hand, was
once mutually profitable [p. 302]. In these ancient times, the wheat of France was exchanged
against Spanish gold. However, the Franco-Spanish trade of his day no longer seemed to
bring reciprocal benefit. He deplores “the unequal treatment that the Spanish receive in
France and that the French receive in Spain with regard to the taxes levied on goods” [p. 351].
Worse, he remarks that the English have the right to trade more freely than the Spanish!
                                                                                                                                                         
systematically a zero-sum game is perceived by Montchrestien. On the contrary, it is not so sure, as Spector
claims [2003, p. 206], that morality is essentially a private thing for Montchrestien. In our opinion,
Montchrestien does not isolate morality from the economy, as is proved by his comments regarding Censure.
26
 The confusion of “internal” and “national” commerce is a recent phenomenon.
 
One does not have to be the
prisoner of retrospective illusion to speak of a “Nation-State” in the 17th Century, except to write a teleological
history. Let us note moreover that the “nations” of the era were totally different from the idea of the nation as it
was understood in France at the end of the 18
th
 Century. Indeed, the Kingdom of France, as Montchrestien
described it, and as was obvious to readers of his time, is made up of peoples and, in certain cases, “nations”
(such as the Angevine nation).
27
 Montchrestien’s hypothesis does not refer to the “state of nature” that was to become so widely accepted.
Within the Kingdom, the monarch can transform the “multitude” into a “social body” because he is at once
“Love” and the trustee of “Divine Authority”. On the other hand, the state of nature does indeed exist between
the kingdoms and republics which make up the world. Hence the question of jus gentium which is dealt with
below.
28
 The expression belongs to Sahlins [1972].
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Rather surprising for a mercantilist, Montchrestien insists on the fact that genuine commercial
reciprocity could be advantageous to all. If the French monarch could equalise the rights of
his subjects and the rights of the Spaniards [p. 356] we could “supply them in abundance with
the principal goods they need forty percent cheaper than they can procure them in Spain”.
Montchrestien considers that commercial reciprocity would be beneficial to the welfare of the
Spanish since he perceived the possibility of gain resulting from trade. His belief reflects the
development of a merchant society
29
 in the 17
th
 Century: we are no longer dealing with the
ideal of a strict exchange of equivalents, the sole aim of which is to preserve the ancient
phylia at the heart of the polis.
Montchrestien is nonetheless aware that the extension of commercial freedom that he
demands is not necessarily advantageous from a fiscal point of view. With reference to the
King of Spain and the French, he underlines, “He would in reality gain nothing but we would
not lose anything either”. He consequently calls for higher considerations of justice: “So long
as all the provinces of France are freely open to Spain, why should the greatest and best of
Spanish provinces be closed and forbidden to France?” Because commerce should be
regulated by the jus gentium, he insists that commercial partners should have the same
rights
30
. This is why we must explain the precise nature of this dual model of exchange. Could
there not have been, for this author, a third possible model of exchange – the commerce of the
jus gentium, where foreign transactions are profitable for all, even if the State does not
necessarily gain extra benefit? According to this model, states guarantee the protection of
those who participate in trade and the symmetry of commercial relationships. It is interesting
to note that Montchrestien lambasts the lack of freedom that the King of Spain inflicts on his
subjects whilst, on the other hand, he praises the French King who supports the universal jus
gentium [p. 359] and “free trade”. The qualifier, “free”, should not however be taken literally:
freedom here refers to a system of privileges granted by royal authority to merchants, giving
them the means to trade freely
31
. Our current “economic freedom” is in no way a given of
Montchrestien’s society. Similarly, all misinterpretation with regard to political freedom must
be avoided. When Montchrestien defends France as the land of freedom, as he so often does,
he means that the State frees any man who enters the territory from serfdom and that he is
protected against arbitrary treatment: the “absolute” monarch is by no means a despot
32
.
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 The “merchant society” we describe here is obviously to be distinguished from Polanyi’s “market society”
which developed in the 19
th
 Century [Polanyi, 1977, p. 12].
30
 Curiously, Billacois asks himself if Montchrestien had not read Grotius, yet the text he refers to, De jure pacis
et belli, was not published until 1625! This work is dedicated to Louis XIII, Grotius having taken refuge in
France. It would be better to ask, “Had Grotius read Montchrestien?”
31
 Here, we are concerned with the “defensive capitalism” described by Commons [1924]. It might seem odd that
these “freedoms” are often the result of the creation of monopolies which benefit private individuals or
companies. However, the reduction of arbitrary feudal rules created possibilities for entrepreneurs. In this
respect, Montchrestien’s work is a reflection of this new state of affairs. Commons considers that “the guilds
were defensive capitalism” [p. 226]. The “offensive stage” of capitalism” [p. 228] no longer needs these ancient
monopolies, the existence of which was the precondition for the development of the defensive phase. The profits
of the monopolies thus cease to be legitimate. Therefore, the modern aim of the common law, according to
Commons, is to abolish private jurisdictions which hinder competition. Modern or “offensive” capitalism is thus
a legal construction which forms part of a long drawn-out process of institutionalisation. For Commons, this
does not mean that the pure ideal of competition is an intangible given of capitalism because the economic
power of big companies and the development of credit money is what justified the interventionism of Roosevelt
[Commons, 1934, p. 612].
32
 Indeed, the monarch is absolute in the sense that he is free from any link, except the link that exists between
him and God.
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“Mercantilism”, Commerce and Money
If forms of exchange are at the very heart of Montchrestien’s work, whether with regard to the
exchange of goods or to the exchange which takes place between the monarch and his
subjects, it is more difficult to determine the role of money and prices. Although these issues
are often debated in detail by the author, it is not clear how they are linked with the rest of his
work which, on the contrary, seems to us to form a coherent system. If the question of
sovereignty is central to Montchrestien’s work, money does not necessarily occupy the key
place that we sometimes allow it. Furthermore, we shall see how the “mercantilist” Cantillon
separates sovereignty from money.
Montchrestien, using a purely economic line of reasoning, holds that the devaluation of
monies is a worrying cause of social disorder since it erodes fixed income, impeding the
normal course of business [p. 319-20]. This conception of monetary phenomena can be even
better understood as it is described by Cantillon [1755, p. 155 sq.]. Examining the events of
1714, he explains that the manipulations of the unit of account, although profitable to the
King, can be detrimental to his subjects. Where Montchrestien only has a vague idea of a
mechanism and of the perverse effects of wanting to stop it from functioning correctly,
Cantillon makes a precise analysis of it. His analysis of Portugal’s policy, the unintended and
negative effects of which upset the harmony of the commercial mechanism [p. 144 sq.], is
extremely revealing. Let us suppose that the King of this country wanted to make savings on
the export of precious metals, in an artificial way, using prohibitions which cause “terror”.
The result would only be to make the price of highly-desired imported goods rise,
encouraging law-breaking: “There is no advantage to be gained from such a law; on the
contrary, it will severely disadvantage Portugal since it causes even more money to leave the
country than would be the case if such a law had never existed” [p. 145]. There is in this the
outline of a pure economic model which puts a price on risk and presents the lawbreaker as an
entrepreneur. It illustrates the perverse effects of interventionism, following a logic which was
to have considerable future success.
Nevertheless, with Cantillon, there is no system which rejects the principle of State
intervention:  “The export of the State’s manufactured products must, so far as possible, be
encouraged
33
 ”, he wrote [p. 129], similarly to Montchrestien. Criticising states such as France
and Spain which “do not take into account in their policy the way in which trade would be
advantageous” [p. 133], Cantillon deplores the fact that “most merchants in France and Spain
who trade with the foreigner are rather agents of the foreign merchants than entrepreneurs
trading on their own account” [p. 133, our italics]. Montchrestien [p. 308-309] had already
made such a criticism: “I have already said that we allowed our business to be looked after by
the agents of foreign traders […] Thus we became the agents of the agents”
34
. From the
retrospective point of view, it thus might be argued that there is a rupture in the logic of
Cantillon’s work which may lead him to be considered as an author of transition between
mercantilism and liberalism.
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 The “State” in this sense is not the State as we know it today. Cantillon uses this term to refer to a kingdom or
the territories of a republic, as was common in his day.  
34
 In addition, Montchrestien fears that the consequence of the presence of these young foreign agents ruled by
their masters is that “The Republic is filled with mongrels” [p. 309], a “shame” amongst others [p. 208]. We see
to what extent Montchrestien’s work amalgamates the categories that Cantillon on the contrary isolates so as to
concentrate solely on the study of mechanisms.
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For Montchrestien and Cantillon, the key to monetary and financial stability is the
balance of public finances. Cantillon [p. 167] is well-known for his criticisms of Law’s
system, the ultimate aim of which was to absorb the State’s debt via an “abundance of
fictitious and imaginary money”. This causes the “same disadvantages as an increase of real
money in circulation”. Similarly, Montchrestien [1615, p. 259] had already held, not without
some pathos, that the Royal debt must be reduced as much as possible since it serves as “a
squadron of bloodsuckers on your people” [p. 260]. The Turkish model is, in this respect, an
example of “good administration”, on account of the proportionately small number of people
operating in the system of public finance and of the “middle way” that one finds there
[p. 322]. Montchrestien, in a rather surprising way for a “mercantilist”, underlines that the
Ottoman sultan, an “absolute” monarch like the King to whom he is addressing his advice,
tolerates the free movement of currencies in Cairo
35
. The political absolutism that is so
praised by Montchrestien does not necessarily entail the monopoly to mint money. In
removing money from this central position, Montchrestien may be seen as a particular kind of
mercantilist. But, indeed, Cantillon is also a strange mercantilist, if mercantilism is above all
an art which aims to obtain a trade surplus.
Actually, according to Cantillon [1755, p. 107], fluctuations in the money supply
cannot affect the cycle of state power in the long-term: at best, the “able minister” can only
“start the cycle off again” for states which seem to be governed by natural law. The same
applies when excess wealth comes from “industrious inhabitants” rather than from the
exploitation of local mines. Cantillon attempts to show all the advantages that can result from
this tendency towards ‘industry”. He recommends the adoption of an active policy in favour
of “ample navigation” and “manufactured products that are sent abroad” [p. 101], since
metallic wealth generated by conquest seems to him to be totally harmful (as shown by the
case of Spain), contrary to a trade surplus
36
. Finally, legislating to allow the hoarding of this
latter is, without doubt, the only lasting benefit, to the extent the State can thus keep the metal
“for unforeseen emergencies” [p. 102]
37
. Cantillon even employs a sophisticated argument to
show that the increase of the money supply does not simply cause a rise in prices but also a
distortion of market prices so that, to use a contemporary expression, money is not neutral.
Indeed, depending on whether one is far or remote from the source of the additional flow of
money, whether one lives with a stable income or not, the increase in the flow of money
produces different effects, resulting not only in the distortion of the original distribution of
earnings but also in the modification of the very structure of global production [p. 92]. This,
moreover, is why Hayek’s [1931] attention was drawn to this type of reasoning, which does
not mask the complexity of the monetary processes at work in the economic process and
which underlines the vanity of the policy of modifying the economic structure. This is where
we find a central difference with Montchrestien whose analysis concerning the means of
fighting against the high cost of goods illustrates well his belief in the effectiveness of
political action.
Pointing out that the Kingdom had to suffer the consequences of ever-increasing
quantities of gold coming from the Americas which caused “the prices of all sorts of
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 However, Montchrestien affirms:  “Only he who is the architect of the Law can make law for monies”. Hence
the centrality of money and of the King, entities which are closely linked. However, the Ottoman example given
by Montchrestien does not clearly illustrate this link since, in this case, the sovereignty of the Prince seems not to
necessarily be exercised in relation to money. Does Montchrestien contradict himself here?
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 See the virtuous case of England, p. 94 and p. 95 n1.
37
 At the beginning of the 20th Century, the gold standard was, in fact, a managed gold standard and gold
hoarding was advocated in order to prevent currency inflation from causing a worthless economic cycle and the
consequent inflation of prices calling for their subsequent deflation.
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commodities to rise” [Montchrestien, 1615, p. 397], he asserts that “the essential value of
merchandise is static […] that nothing is expensive that was ever cheap” [p. 397]. He
recommends the simple application of existing laws to lower the price of goods, as if the issue
was not the general level of prices but rather the level of certain relative prices essential for
the livelihood of the people. In a very classical way, he considers it necessary for the State to
fight against speculators by regulating the grain market so that prices can return to their
previous level: “To conclude, it is only via this regulation (such as Your Majesty can establish
and operate it in this Kingdom) that the price of merchandise and essential supplies can return
to its original level” [p. 398]. Montchrestien describes the inflationary phenomenon via the
changes in the structure of relative prices which affects the division of income: certain social
classes are more exposed than others to this process of price fluctuation. This can create
injustice on account of the destablising character of speculation and the danger of excessive
freedom in the circulation of grain: “Due to the transactions of a few, an entire Province can
end up starving” [p. 400]. Our inventor of political economy thus contributed to the debate
that would last until the end of the 18
th
 Century. Montchrestien perhaps stands out when he
underlines that the dissymmetry of trade, due to the unequal distribution of wealth within the
Kingdom itself [p. 400-401], makes commerce harmful, although in the normal course of
events, when it is well-managed, it contributes to the prosperity of all. He thus suggests that
the King must “first order that those who accumulate grain (and harvest all the fields in a
country without selling the grain to the people) should be forbidden from doing so” [p. 398].
Therefore, these little market-runners […] monopolists of basic essentials, all those who cause
prices to rise everywhere they operate, must be suffocated. Those who devour all the
sustenance and food of the people are true leeches” [p. 399].
Cantillon, on the other hand, in no way sees Montchrestien’s “market-runners” as
dangerous pests, capable of harming the process which allows economic equilibrium to be
established. They are rather seen as social categories who, living under the weight of
incertitude (“entrepreneurs live with a risky income” [Cantillon, 1755, p. 31]), pay the price
of the establishment of a social order in which the dominant classes – “people […] who live
with a fixed income” – set the level and the structure of overall spending.  He even goes so far
as to distinguish the class of entrepreneurs from the class of non-entrepreneurs and notes that
“thieves are [forming a class] of entrepreneurs” [p. 32] (such an affirmation might have been
made by a modern-day economist). This subordinated class of “entrepreneurs” is permanently
exposed to “bankruptcy” as the necessary consequence of a market economy, the
effectiveness of which is de facto superior to a planned economy. It is no coincidence if
Austrian economists, particularly those of the most recent school, have placed so much
emphasis on the role of the entrepreneur in the market process: as capitalism has developed,
the crucial role of arbitration and of speculation has become central.
On the other hand, whereas a coherent analysis of market processes or of economic
equilibrium has no place in the Traicté, labour occupies a key position. He explains that in
order to face foreign competition, the workforce must be educated. Political economy is
mostly a policy for the education of man. Consequently, Montchrestien is convinced that “no
animal in the world is born more stupid than man. But, in a few short years, he can be made
capable of great things. Whosoever can make something good out of this living tool […] can
glory in the fact that he has made the best of the economy and government” [Montchrestien,
1615, p. 61]. He recalls how the Romans reportedly placed much importance on the education
of their servants. Finally, he deduces that the chronic lack of employment in the Kingdom is
due to a lack of qualifications [p. 61-2] and that it is for the good of the public that the poor
should be obliged to work [p. 62-3]. The correct policy with relation to the “employment of
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men” is, consequently, to imitate the English and the Dutch who had once learnt from us [p.
119]. He applauds the fact that, in Switzerland and Germany, “there is hardly a bourg in
which the Lord does not finance a few colleges in order to instruct his poor subjects in the
liberal arts and in the mechanical trades” [p. 120]. It is thus necessary to follow the Dutch
example of “schools” [p. 121]. Even if these places are most certainly aimed at the “assistance
of the poor” [p. 122], Montchrestien underlines the fact that the Dutch system also places
emphasis on apprenticeship. In this way, the “common good” [p. 119] is achieved through the
fact that the poor are no longer “dependent on the State” [p. 122].
Montchrestien’s arguments are novel: this way of thinking about work was taken up by
Colbert, in other words, well after 1615. It would thus be possible to use the central place
given to work to redefine the concept of mercantilism. For Montchrestien, if many nations
were once, in a way, the “pupils” of the French, by his day it was the French who had been
overcome by external competition and who should become the pupils: “As for everything
else, the place has already been taken. If we want to attend the theatre, it must be as spectators
since we are incapable of getting up on stage to act. All the roles have already been allocated
to the people who know how to play them best [p. 346]. The pupils who have become our
teachers are chiefly the English [p. 99]. He is not just concerned about that fact that the
English have overcome their technical backwardness, thus competing with the people of
France, but he also worries about the possible consequences of the King’s decision to allow
English capital to build a factory [p. 100] given that the English do not use the work of the
French for the latter’s own good [p. 101]. Therefore, the visible hand of the monarch is seen
as a condition for the correct functioning of the economy.
For Cantillon, the visible hand of State is not a necessary precondition of an economic
society, since he shows the possibility of the emergence of a kind of social order independent
from politics, i.e. he demonstrates the possibility of an invisible hand. But, as the author of the
transition from a merchant to a market society, he shares the typically mercantilist fear of
foreign competition. Cantillon stands half-way between the usual mercantilist theses and
liberal theses. He approves of royal interventions which aim to boost manufacturing, thus
preventing monetary wealth from escaping abroad. The rule of the “best market” cannot be
adopted, otherwise the Dutch would be “the only carriers in Europe” [Cantillon, 1755,
p. 132], which means that outside the borders of a given “State” – be it a republic or a
kingdom – spontaneous market mechanisms are not effective. With regard to kingdoms which
can claim to be self-sufficient, such as England or France, he writes, “They must not allow the
falling off of their own articles and manufactures nor become dependent on the foreigner, still
less allow their money to be taken away for that purpose [p. 131]. Here, Cantillon is very
close to Montchrestien. Cantillon, one of those who prefigured the “invisible hand”, calls for
the very visible hand of politics to “encourage, as far as possible, the exportation of the
articles and manufactures of the State” because “the increase in the quantity of silver
circulating in a state gives it great advantages in foreign trade so long as this abundance of
money lasts” [p. 129]. This state of affairs gives birth to a cycle: the abundance which reigns
in the kingdom produces contradictory forces which prompt a return to a certain equilibrium.
All occurs as if the wisdom of the economist could only ensure that the State can benefit from
an advantage during the only transitory period determined by two points of equilibrium.
The issue of mass poverty that lies behind many of Montchrestien’s and Cantillon’s
proposals is particularly important
38
: the modern era is that of the poor laws, the financial cost
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 Note the importance given to man whose work is the source of wealth: from this point of view, it is man’s lack
of education which is the cause of disorder, such as underemployment. The problem is fundamentally political:
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of which is well-known. Montchrestien takes part in a debate that was particularly lively in
the 17
th
 Century and which only ended in the 19
th
 Century (at least in that particular form). In
this respect, Polanyi [1944] shows the impact of Townsend’s text, the Dissertation on the
Poor Laws
39
, written in 1786, in which a biological portrayal of society is a means of
radically emancipating the economy from politics. Adam Smith’s political economy,
impregnated with moral discourse and all kinds of cautionary notes did not herald the
ideology of the market society [p. 115]. The Dissertation, using the example of a Pacific
island populated by goats and dogs - prey and their predators - explains that a natural
equilibrium exists. Should any species proliferate beyond a sustainable level, the excessive
mortality resulting from the scarcity of resources will be the key to a process of adjustment
40
.
So Polanyi can write that “The economic society had emerged as distinct from the political
state” [p. 115]. He underlines the lack of empirical evidence to support this fable. Yet, this is
not the main point. The fable relies on the curious notion of identification rather than
metaphor: “Hobbes had argued the need for a despot because men were like beasts; Townsend
insisted that they were actually beasts and that, precisely for that reason, only a minimum of
government was required” [Polanyi italics, p. 114]. Townsend’s model animalises man: it
assumes that competition by all against all allows the development of economic and thus
social harmony, without politics being necessary.
Montchrestien’s theory is the total opposite of that of Townsend, on account of his
peculiar conception of sociability and his demonstration of the necessity of the visible hand of
the King to be properly used. An important dimension of political economy is, in that respect,
the necessary protection of economic agents by political power, since foreign trade, although
unpredictable and dangerous, is indispensable to the common good. This is not just about
protecting the Kingdom from the foreign competition which reduces employment [p. 104],
but also about promoting a genuine policy which aims to substitute imports with domestic
production. To the objection that the quest for autarchy is a cause of war, Montchrestien
responds that it is the rest of the world that needs France more than France needs the world:
the size of the population of the kingdom at this time should not lead us to consider this
proposition as absurd. Montchrestien is nonetheless aware that the public benefit resulting
from the employment of the poor can a priori be to the detriment of affordable supplies. But
“the benefit to the public is more important than any other advantages that may be advanced”
[p. 326]. He does not however just develop this argument concerning social stability, so
necessary to the prosperity of the Kingdom. He also explains that the development of
domestic production will allow prices to fall as low as possible. The argument has some
coherence, aside from its preemptory rhetoric, since it involves the recognition of a certain
length of time necessary to the development of this production that can alone provide
temporary protection and allow the workforce to be well-educated. State control should go
further and determine the correct amount of production. Here, mercantilism seems to be a
doctrine generalising the customs of medieval towns to territories incomparably more vast.
The market as a process of price fixing and the determination of optimal quantities is absent.
                                                                                                                                                         
the King has not yet taken the correct measures to correct the “dysfunctional” economy. This is why we do not
accept Perrot’s idea [1992, pp. 145-146] according to which Montchrestien generally holds that the poverty of
the kingdom is the result of the “corruption” of  “lazy stomachs”, even if some citations may encourage one to
regard Montchrestien more as a moralistic writer than as a scholar of political economy.
39
 http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/townsend/poorlaw.html
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 Therefore, the proliferation of one species over another is only a short-term phenomenon. Townsend himself
transposes the story to human society: “Thus a new kind of balance was established. The weakest of both species
were among the first to pay the debt of nature; the most active and vigorous preserved their lives. It is the
quantity of food which regulates the numbers of the human species” (quoted by Polanyi [1944, p. 113]. Thus,
state intervention is deemed unnecessary.
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Montchrestien, dealing with the issue of the possible excess of production and of the
necessary profits of artificers writes, “The wise ruler must carefully invent the means to
govern, finding the right balance between too little and too great” [Montchrestien, 1615,
p. 127].
Once again, the contrast is striking between how this issue is dealt with in the Essai.
Cantillon [1775, p. 28] shows that “the circulation and the exchange of commodities, as well
as their production, are carried out in Europe by entrepreneurs, and at a risk” because the
market mechanisms can produce order from parts of the economy which may at first seem
incompatible. Indeed, trade-off carried out by entrepreneurs allows consumption and
production to be adjusted as best as possible in the social interest, something which politics
cannot do just as well. It is moreover this way of thinking about equilibrium which leads
Cantillon to conclude that deliberate action to educate the workforce is generally useless
[p. 14-15]. He believes that the allocation of labour occurs spontaneously. He explains, “If the
King of France were to send one hundred thousand of his subjects to Holland to learn
seafaring, they would be useless on their return if no more vessels were sent to sea than
before”. Nonetheless, Cantillon’s arguments are more nuanced and, in some ways, reveal
themselves to be mercantilist. When he takes into account the consequences of foreign
competition in his analysis of the internal equilibrium of the kingdom, he concludes that the
savings made on imports thanks to a more skilled workforce (which would result from royal
intervention) is a good thing for the State [p. 15].
Cantillon’s model is still essentially different from that of Montchrestien [1615] who
often considers the so-called “natural economy” as a source of the political economy. In the
same passage concerning the “wise ruler” [p. 27], he writes, “It must imitate nature which
never lacks anything essential and which never produces anything superfluous”. Thus, the
monarch’s policy must lead the dysfunctional economy, in the very words of Montchrestien,
back to “nature”.  The meaning of the adjective “nature” should not confuse the reader. This
model of domestic life of course evokes the “middle way” of the great Turkish sultan. The
political economy thus condemns the excessive consumption of wealth which must be
embedded in moral considerations. The economy is the result of a policy constrained by moral
designs. Morality and the need for the accumulation of metal join together harmoniously since
there is a trade deficit with the Levant on account of the elite’s weakness for luxury, the
“public plague and the ruin of monarchies!” [p. 361].
The above arguments have used the concept of mercantilism, yet this concept is difficult
to handle and often throws more shadow than light on the subject once a detailed analysis of
authors generally classified as mercantilists is required. It is on the other hand possible to
argue that, on a quite general level, mercantilism can be defined as the recognition that “the
economy is henceforth the means of exercising power and its very foundation”
41
. In this
sense, it is true that there is a striking opposition between those who support the doctrine of
“doux commerce” and the mercantilists who did not conceive of the economy as a peaceful
sphere. But, at this level of generality, the place of money in mercantilist discourse and its
relationship with sovereignty is not clear. Moreover, the thesis of the “Aristotelian structure”
of mercantilist exchange
42
, which is evidently wide-reaching, is not capable of highlighting
the full originality of Montchrestien who does not neglect the possible mutual profits that may
be gained from exchange.
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 See Spector [2003, p. 302 and p. 308-309].
42
 Larrère’s thesis was taken up by Spector [2003] who, even if she correctly underlines the “profound changes”
of the “Aristotelian” schema, does not fully appreciate all of its consequences.
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Conclusion: The Strength of the Traicté and the Essai
The invention of political economy involved the discovery of the economy as a legitimate
concern of the state, contrary to the Ancients. It meant no longer thinking about good
management as a means of maximising the income of the estate or the city, but rather about
promoting a policy which would aim to increase the wealth of the people. In this sense, the
wealth of the State is a mere consequence of the wealth of the people. Political economy is
not a science of the market in the sense of a science of market principle, because, for
Montchrestien, there are only markets which may be governed by rules, allowing the monarch
to act for the benefit of all. As a rule, current trends thus do not help us understand an author
who is so attached to the issue of sovereignty. This new art, promoted by Montchrestien
[p. 406], is the establishment of good government: it involves moral considerations which
affect the organisation of markets. These are considerations which may seem as ideological as
they are normative and, consequently, non-scientific. On the contrary, Cantillon’s work
prefigures purely economic paradigm on account of the extremely wide definition that he
gives of the entrepreneur and due to a theory of equilibrium; moreover, his way of thinking is
truly modern in the sense that he does not systematically deny the benefits of economic
policy. Admittedly, his proposed state intervention with regard to foreign trade can be used to
claim that his work is archaic, but this would ignore the fact that all ruptures must be
understood in context. More generally, Cantillon seems to us to have effectively inaugurated
the mainstream spirit of economics, which does not define itself as a field of social activity but
rather as a science of choice, independent of the existence of markets.
It would nonetheless be wrong to judge the interest of Montchrestien’s work from the
sole point of view of current economic thought, because it is doubtful that our knowledge is
really free from ideological considerations. Should it not also be remembered that many
economists are now divided on the banishment of powers and institutions which made the
foundation of economics possible? Yet, the hope of reducing phenomena relating to power
and authority to pure economic reason seems questionable
43
. This is why the reading of
ancient texts can encourage some distance to be taken from a certain number of obvious facts.
If an author like Montchrestien contributed to the creation of a genuinely novel kind of
discourse, it is because he considers that men, the source of wealth, should be the principal
concern of the government. Certainly, Montchrestien seems to belong to a time long past
when he echoes the ancient practices of the medieval guilds, suggesting they be applied at the
level of an entire kingdom. Far from Foucault’s conception of liberalism, Montchrestien does
not provide the most efficient technique for the ruling of men
44
.
What is decisive for judging the modernity of a policy is not necessarily its liberal
character but the fact that the economy is the object of policy. It is true that Montchrestien
considers markets as subordinate elements since they are only the economic elements of
                                                 
43
 Elster [1989] claims that reductionisms fail to explain social norms. In particular, he refers to a reductionism in
vogue amongst many economists according to whom norms can be viewed as a system resolving market failures.
Yet, firstly, many norms damage the welfare of all and, secondly, it is not known how the social advantages of
norms may be perpetuated.
44
 See Foucault [1989, p. 112] who characterises “liberal thought” by the hypothesis of “a society which finds
itself in a complex relationship with exteriority and interiority with the State […] The idea of society is what
allows a technology of government to be developed, starting from the principle that it is already, in itself, “too
much” and “in excess”. The important place which Foucault gives to the ordoliberalism of the Fribourg School
should be noted [pp. 117-118].
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politics. Here, we are far removed from what was developed in the 18
th
 Century, with the
birth of classical political economy, since, as Foucault writes, liberal modernity aims to show
that there is “an incompatibility of principle between the optimal functioning of the economic
process and the maximisation of governmental procedures”
45
. From this perspective,
Cantillon is an author of central importance since he shows how the economy can regulate
itself. Good knowledge of Commerce in general can only allow the State and its people to
enjoy the real but temporary benefits of trade, due to the mechanisms which push towards the
spontaneous creation of social order. For this pivotal author, economic policy is thus not
systematically negative but is subordinate to long-term equilibrium which is spontaneously
determined, resulting from the essential exteriority of politics with relation to the economy.
The world presented by Montchrestien is, in principle, different: political economy thus
does not herald a liberal way of thinking. Nevertheless, this does not mean that his project is
not modern because his modernity, as we have seen, is based on the systematic portrayal of
the economy as lying in the public domain. But this does not imply that his political economy,
as a way of governing men, is based on the notion of the autonomy of the economy. It is for
this reason that Perrot’s [1992, pp. 90-91] analysis is questionable: he concludes that
economists “over the course of two centuries” have provided the “hypothesis of spontaneous
regulation”. Montchrestien ought to be excluded from his analysis
46
. This historian also refers
to “Montchrestien’s axiom” according to which “everyone wants to be rich”
47
. This leads him
to write, “This claim is so obvious that it is pointless to write it down”. Yet, for us, it does not
seem possible to link this “axiom” to the hypothesis of the auto-regulation of the economy in
any logical way. Our hypothesis is that this desire for wealth does not have the same meaning
in the emerging political economy of the 17th Century or in the economic discourse which
developed in the 18th Century. First of all, this assertion of the selfish motivations of
mankind, a key element of mainstream thought, cannot be understood in a transhistorical way.
Marx
48
 observes that, as an individual, Brutus knew how to lend his money at the best rate
possible; as for the Romans, “the question is always which mode of property creates the best
citizens”. This example serves to show that the desire to be rich can form part of very
particular institutional systems, making it impossible to draw precise conclusions for a general
analysis. Is it therefore possible, without great risk, to establish continuity between
Montchrestien’s discourse on human nature and, for example, Hume’s economic
anthropology?
In this respect, as was mentioned above, Montchrestien follows a line of thought which
emphasises the mechanistic over the spontaneous and suggests that economy is not an
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 See Foucault [1989, p. 114]. It is in this sense that Foucault considers that the 18th Century economists depart
from mercantilism [p. 115].
46
 Something which Perrot does not do [p. 63]. This is why the issue of the “selfish interest” of the individual and
that of the “regulation of the collectivity” are not elements that can be considered as the two bases of
Montchrestien’s theory (as Perrot suggests [1992, p. 89]). Montchrestien’s idea is not that of the “invisible hand”
and does not involve a conceptual distinction between civil society and the State. As Foucault [1989, p. 113]
underlines,  “Rather than making the distinction between the State and civil society an all-purpose explanation
which allows all concrete systems to be questioned, one should try to see a form of schematisation common to
the particular technology of government”.
47
 The Traicté, cited by Perrot [1992, p. 91, n. 79].
48
 Marx [1857-1858, p. 18] writes: “Do we never find in antiquity an inquiry into which form of landed property
etc. is the most productive and creates the greatest wealth? Wealth does not appear as the aim of production,
although Cato may well investigate which manner of cultivating a field brings the greatest rewards, and Brutus
may even lend out his money at the best rates of interest”.
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autonomous category of thought. But if the market principle
49
 and the use of the invisible
hand metaphor do not mark Montchrestien’s economy, competition does lie at the heart of his
work. This competition, in the sense that we now qualify as international, is thus, before
markets themselves, a striking characteristic of the economy. Actually, most markets are
political codifications of competitive flux. It is moreover this crucial characteristic of
competition, in its most lethal sense, which legitimates this model of triple commerce that we
have mentioned, which is itself the product of a model of double exchange. The “natural”
sociability of the citizens of the kingdom indeed determines the forms of exchange from
which we can all benefit, contrary to external trade which is nothing but a refraction of a war
model. Montchrestien nonetheless considers that the application of the jus gentium could
render external trade beneficial, provided that the imbalance of positions, which result from
state policies, are eliminated. But it is clear that these kinds of benefits presuppose a prior
political agreement. Montchrestien thus contributes to characterising the economy as political.
The strength of his work and the reason why it is still relevant is that the economy and
markets are presented as objects of political considerations which are essential to their very
existence. Functioning markets are expressions of sovereignty, political codifications of the
flux of global competition, themselves instituted by states. Therefore, Montchrestien unveils
another dimension of economic modernity which is still relevant – the recognition that there
can be no economy without sovereignty, except when imagining the antagonistic trend of
modernity which postulates that the market is, as a rule, a self-regulating system. The wisdom
of Cantillon is, in this respect, not to push too far his liberal intuitions concerning the
autonomy of the economy. Therefore, he does not deny that politics may play a role in
creating economic efficiency. However, does the difference between classical liberalism and
some of its contemporary manifestations not actually result from the rise of this “esprit de
système” which distances the theoretician from the necessary test of reality?
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 Ancient markets and the “market principle” should indeed be differentiated. The market principle is a principle
of organisation of economic and social life according to which a network of markets is capable of self-
regulation. These markets are said to be “self-regulating” although, in reality, this self-regulation represents more
the social ideal which legitimates these markets than the reality of self-regulation which is often chaotic.
Nonetheless, the market principle is a fiction which nonetheless is capable of structuring empirical economies.
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